fix(issue-5): address phase 2a cross-review findings (F-A, F-B, R1, R2, R3)

Two reviewers raised five defects. Every one was reproduced here before being
accepted; none were rebutted.

F-A (claude, blocking) -- the CAS table had no row for two transitions the
wrapper legitimately makes, so `submit --type loop|discuss` silently stopped
working by default: the per-iteration re-dispatch was refused and its metadata
discarded, the exhausted-budget finalisation was refused, and the CLI returned 0
both times. Reproduced against the real modules. Fixed by naming those
transitions rather than carving an exception: `redispatch` and `finalize` are
requests gated on operator authority, so the wrapper can move a finished record
while an agent still cannot touch its own terminal. A re-dispatch must advance
the iteration, so a replay cannot resurrect a job. The operator CLI now exits
non-zero with a reason when a write is refused -- the silence is what let this
hide.

F-B (claude) -- moving the audit mirror out of the lock made status.json
last-writer-wins, so a slow flush could leave it behind the registry. It now
carries transition_seq and skips a write that would go backwards, restoring the
sequential consistency the lock used to provide for free.

R1 (codex, blocking) -- the policy called attribution with only the dispatch
record, so it proved the record was well-formed and never confronted the
identifiers the evidence carried. A finalized scenario with a different session,
a different attempt and a manifest from another attempt was still approved.
Observed identifiers are now collected from the timeline and every one must
agree; a manifest belonging to another attempt holds. Collecting every
occurrence rather than the first matters, because taking the first would drop
exactly the contradicting value this is meant to catch.

R2 (codex, blocking) -- a supplied expected_attempt was ignored when the record
had no attempt field, so a compare-and-swap with nothing to compare committed.
It now fails closed, which matters because 2b plans to gate inferred completion
on precisely that precondition.

R3 (codex) -- a status could ride in as an ordinary field, so `progress` could
commit a terminal from inside the boundary that exists to prevent it. Status is
now settable only by the request that owns it, unknown requests are refused, and
pending has an owning request instead of being an untyped merge.

Each of the eleven new regressions was checked against the pre-fix code first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UrDNJkHmm18uu7n7JwV5Qd

.agents/skills/lib_py/delegation/engine.py

@@ -48,13 +48,26 @@ REQUEST_TO_STATUS = {
     "cancelled": "cancelled",
     "deadline_timeout": "error",
     "merge": None,
+    # Operator-authority requests. The wrapper drives multi-iteration delegation
+    # (`submit --type loop|discuss`) by re-dispatching a finished job to the next
+    # session, and by finalising it as an error when the iteration budget is
+    # exhausted. Both legitimately move a terminal record, which is why they are
+    # separate requests gated on authority rather than an exception in the table.
+    "redispatch": "pending",
+    "finalize": "error",
 }
 
+# Only these sources may move a record out of a terminal state. An agent can
+# never walk back its own terminal; that is the whole point of the CAS table.
+OPERATOR_SOURCES = ("registry_cli", "operator")
+OPERATOR_REQUESTS = ("redispatch", "finalize")
+
 # A caller that merges `status=<value>` is making the request that owns that
 # value; mapping it here is what stops a raw field write from sidestepping the
-# CAS table. `pending` has no owning request (nothing transitions *to* pending),
+# CAS table. Every status has an owning request, `pending` included: the wrapper
-# so it stays an ordinary metadata merge, exactly as before.
+# resets a finished job to pending to hand it to the next iteration.
 STATUS_TO_REQUEST = {
+    "pending": "redispatch",
     "running": "started",
     "completed": "completed",
     "error": "error",
@@ -93,17 +106,37 @@ class _Decision(object):
         self.conflict = conflict
 
 
-def _decide(record: Dict[str, Any], request: str, expected_status, expected_attempt) -> _Decision:
+def _decide(record: Dict[str, Any], request: str, expected_status, expected_attempt,
+            source="unknown", fields=None) -> _Decision:
     """Pure CAS decision. No I/O, so it is safe to call under the lock.
 
     Implements the target table in docs/contracts/issue-5/state-transitions.md §3.
     """
     current = record.get("status")
+    fields = fields or {}
 
-    # Stale attempt or generation loses before anything else is considered.
+    # An unrecognised request must never fall through to the permissive branch.
+    if request not in REQUEST_TO_STATUS:
+        return _Decision(False, current, "unknown request: {!r}".format(request))
+
+    # A status may only be set by the request that owns it. Letting one ride in
+    # as an ordinary field would let `progress` commit a terminal, which is the
+    # decision table being bypassed from inside its own boundary.
+    if "status" in fields:
+        return _Decision(False, current,
+                         "status must be requested, not merged as a field "
+                         "(got status={!r} on request {!r})".format(fields["status"], request))
+
+    # A supplied precondition must be *proved*, not merely un-contradicted. If a
+    # caller names an expected attempt and the record cannot show one, the
+    # compare-and-swap has nothing to compare and must fail closed.
     if expected_attempt is not None:
         actual = record.get("attempt_id", record.get("iteration"))
-        if actual is not None and actual != expected_attempt:
+        if actual is None:
+            return _Decision(False, current,
+                             "expected attempt {!r} but the record carries none".format(
+                                 expected_attempt))
+        if actual != expected_attempt:
             return _Decision(False, current,
                              "stale attempt: expected {!r}, record has {!r}".format(
                                  expected_attempt, actual))
@@ -115,10 +148,34 @@ def _decide(record: Dict[str, Any], request: str, expected_status, expected_atte
 
     requested = REQUEST_TO_STATUS.get(request, None)
 
+    # Authority first, so a refusal says *why* rather than blaming the state.
+    if request in OPERATOR_REQUESTS and source not in OPERATOR_SOURCES:
+        return _Decision(False, current,
+                         "{} requires operator authority (source={!r})".format(request, source))
+
     if current in TERMINAL_STATUSES:
         # Idempotent re-receipt of the same terminal is a no-op ack.
         if requested == current:
             return _Decision(False, current, "idempotent: already {}".format(current))
+
+        operator = source in OPERATOR_SOURCES
+        if operator and request == "redispatch":
+            # Re-dispatching a finished job to the next iteration. The attempt
+            # must move forward, so a replayed redispatch cannot resurrect it.
+            new_iteration = fields.get("iteration")
+            old_iteration = record.get("iteration")
+            if new_iteration is None:
+                return _Decision(False, current,
+                                 "redispatch requires an iteration", conflict=True)
+            if old_iteration is not None and int(new_iteration) <= int(old_iteration):
+                return _Decision(False, current,
+                                 "redispatch iteration {!r} does not advance past {!r}".format(
+                                     new_iteration, old_iteration), conflict=True)
+            return _Decision(True, "pending", "{} -> pending (redispatch)".format(current))
+
+        if operator and request in ("finalize", "error"):
+            return _Decision(True, "error", "{} -> error (finalize)".format(current))
+
         if requested is None:
             return _Decision(False, current,
                              "late {} after terminal {}; refusing".format(request, current),
@@ -128,8 +185,8 @@ def _decide(record: Dict[str, Any], request: str, expected_status, expected_atte
                          conflict=True)
 
     if requested is None:
-        # progress / permission_required / metadata-only merge: the engine does
+        # progress / permission_required / metadata-only merge. No status is set
-        # not set a status, so any status in `fields` is applied as-is.
+        # here: a status-bearing field was already refused above.
         return _Decision(True, None, "metadata updated ({})".format(request))
 
     return _Decision(True, requested, "{} -> {}".format(current, requested))
@@ -155,7 +212,8 @@ def transition(job_id, request="merge", *, registry_dir=None, expected_status=No
     with mqtt_common.registry_lock(registry_dir):
         record = mqtt_common.load_job(job_id, registry_dir)
         from_status = record.get("status")
-        decision = _decide(record, request, expected_status, expected_attempt)
+        decision = _decide(record, request, expected_status, expected_attempt,
+                           source=source, fields=fields)
 
         notifications: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
         if decision.commit:
@@ -206,7 +264,8 @@ def _flush(notifications, registry_dir) -> None:
         try:
             if kind == "status_changed":
                 mqtt_common.update_logged_status(
-                    job_id, note["to"], updated_at=note.get("timestamp"))
+                    job_id, note["to"], updated_at=note.get("timestamp"),
+                    transition_seq=note.get("transition_seq"))
                 mqtt_common.append_event(job_id, {
                     "event": "status_changed",
                     "from": note.get("from"),

.agents/skills/lib_py/delegation/mqtt_common.py

@@ -392,7 +392,8 @@ def _atomic_write_record(job_id: str, registry_dir: str, record: Dict[str, Any])
         raise
 
 
-def update_job_status(job_id: str, registry_dir: str = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR, **fields: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+def update_job_status(job_id: str, registry_dir: str = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR,
+                      _source: str = "unknown", **fields: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Merge ``fields`` into a job record through the single transition boundary.
 
     Signature, return value and exceptions are unchanged: phase 1's G-1..G-4
@@ -408,17 +409,31 @@ def update_job_status(job_id: str, registry_dir: str = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR, **f
     if not engine.cas_enabled():
         return _update_job_status_legacy(job_id, registry_dir, **fields)
 
+    # The status-to-request mapping lives in transition_job_status so it happens
+    # exactly once; doing it here as well would strip the status before the
+    # mapping could see it.
+    result = transition_job_status(job_id, registry_dir, _source=_source, **fields)
+    return result.record
+
+
+def transition_job_status(job_id: str, registry_dir: str = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR,
+                          _source: str = "unknown", **fields: Any):
+    """Same write, but returns the full TransitionResult.
+
+    ``update_job_status`` must keep returning the record because phase 1's
+    contracts and the shell helpers depend on that shape. A caller that needs to
+    know whether the transition was actually committed -- the operator CLI, which
+    used to exit 0 on a silently refused write -- uses this instead.
+    """
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine  # same package: no sibling hop (see __init__)
+
     request = "merge"
     if "status" in fields:
-        # A merged status value is really a transition request; routing it to the
-        # owning request is what subjects it to the CAS table instead of letting
-        # a raw field write slip past it.
         request = engine.STATUS_TO_REQUEST.get(fields["status"], "merge")
         if request != "merge":
             fields = {k: v for k, v in fields.items() if k != "status"}
-    result = engine.transition(job_id, request, registry_dir=registry_dir,
+    return engine.transition(job_id, request, registry_dir=registry_dir,
-                               fields=fields, source="update_job_status")
+                             fields=fields, source=_source)
-    return result.record
 
 
 def _update_job_status_legacy(job_id: str, registry_dir: str = DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR, **fields: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
@@ -549,10 +564,31 @@ def append_event(job_id: str, event_dict: Dict[str, Any], logs_dir: Optional[str
 
 def update_logged_status(job_id: str, status: str, logs_dir: Optional[str] = None, **extras: Any) -> None:
     """Rewrite ``<logs>/<job_id>/status.json`` (current status for fast point
-    queries) atomically. Best-effort; merges any ``extras``."""
+    queries) atomically. Best-effort; merges any ``extras``.
+
+    Ordering: this used to run under the registry lock, which serialised it for
+    free. Phase 2a moved the mirror outside the lock to keep the transaction
+    short, so a slow flush could otherwise land after a newer one and leave this
+    file behind the registry. When the caller supplies ``transition_seq`` the
+    write is skipped if the file already records a newer transition, which
+    restores the sequential consistency the lock used to provide.
+    """
     try:
         path = job_log_path(job_id, STATUS_FILENAME, logs_dir)
         path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+        incoming_seq = extras.get("transition_seq")
+        if incoming_seq is not None and path.exists():
+            try:
+                existing = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                existing_seq = existing.get("transition_seq")
+                if existing_seq is not None and int(existing_seq) >= int(incoming_seq):
+                    logger.debug("skipping stale status mirror for %s (seq %s <= %s)",
+                                 job_id, incoming_seq, existing_seq)
+                    return
+            except Exception:
+                pass  # unreadable existing file: fall through and rewrite it
+
         record: Dict[str, Any] = {"job_id": job_id, "status": status, "updated_at": _utcnow()}
         record.update(extras)
         tmp = path.with_name(path.name + ".tmp")

.agents/skills/lib_py/delegation/publish_event.py

@@ -176,7 +176,10 @@ def record_outcome(prepared: PreparedEvent, registry_dir: str,
     new_status = EVENT_TO_STATUS.get(prepared.event)
     if new_status:
         try:
-            mqtt_common.update_job_status(prepared.job_id, registry_dir, status=new_status)
+            # Agent authority on purpose: an agent may never move a terminal
+            # record, which is what the operator-only requests are gated for.
+            mqtt_common.update_job_status(prepared.job_id, registry_dir,
+                                          _source="publish_event", status=new_status)
         except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - best effort
             logger.warning("status sync failed: %s", exc)
 

.agents/skills/lib_py/delegation/registry.py

@@ -326,6 +326,26 @@ def _build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     return parser
 
 
+def _operator_write(job_id: str, registry_dir: str, **fields) -> int:
+    """Apply an operator-authority write and report refusal on the exit status.
+
+    Before phase 2a this path could not be refused, so it always exited 0. Once
+    the CAS boundary can decline a write, exiting 0 anyway would hide it -- which
+    is exactly how a refused loop re-dispatch looked like success to the wrapper.
+    """
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine  # same package: no sibling hop (see __init__)
+
+    if not engine.cas_enabled():
+        mqtt_common.update_job_status(job_id, registry_dir, **fields)
+        return 0
+    result = mqtt_common.transition_job_status(
+        job_id, registry_dir, _source="registry_cli", **fields)
+    if not result.committed:
+        print("refused: {}".format(result.reason), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 4
+    return 0
+
+
 def main(argv: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> int:
     mqtt_common.ensure_env_loaded()
     mqtt_common.setup_logging(logging.INFO)
@@ -374,11 +394,11 @@ def main(argv: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> int:
 
     if args.command == "status":
         try:
-            update_status(args.job, rd, args.status)
+            rc = _operator_write(args.job, rd, status=args.status)
         except (FileNotFoundError, ValueError) as exc:
             print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
             return 1
-        return 0
+        return rc
 
     if args.command == "update":
         fields = {}
@@ -393,11 +413,11 @@ def main(argv: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> int:
         if args.role is not None:
             fields["role"] = args.role
         try:
-            mqtt_common.update_job_status(args.job, rd, **fields)
+            rc = _operator_write(args.job, rd, **fields)
         except FileNotFoundError as exc:
             print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
             return 1
-        return 0
+        return rc
 
     if args.command == "get-feedback":
         print(get_feedback(args.job, rd))

.agents/skills/lib_py/loop/policy.py

@@ -25,6 +25,31 @@ def _timeline_by_kind(scenario):
     return out
 
 
+def collect_observed_identity(scenario) -> dict:
+    """Gather identifiers the *evidence* carries, for comparison with dispatch.
+
+    Without this, attribution only proves the dispatch record is internally
+    well-formed -- it never confronts what was actually seen. Association of a
+    job or attempt to an observation is the external collector's business, so
+    these are read from the timeline items and the report manifest, never
+    invented as native Herdr fields.
+    """
+    observed = {}
+    for item in scenario.get("timeline") or []:
+        payload = item.get("payload") or {}
+        for field in ("job_id", "attempt_id", "agent_session_uuid",
+                      "pane_process_generation"):
+            if payload.get(field) is not None:
+                # Every occurrence is kept. Taking only the first would let a
+                # later, contradicting observation pass unnoticed -- which is the
+                # opposite of what this collection is for.
+                observed.setdefault(field, []).append(payload[field])
+        manifest = payload.get("report_manifest")
+        if isinstance(manifest, dict) and manifest.get("attempt_id") is not None:
+            observed.setdefault("manifest_attempt_id", []).append(manifest["attempt_id"])
+    return observed
+
+
 def decide(scenario) -> Decision:
     """Map one composite scenario to a decision.
 
@@ -62,11 +87,31 @@ def decide(scenario) -> Decision:
     if latest.get("agent_status") == "blocked" or latest.get("matched_rule"):
         return Decision("hold_blocked", "agent is blocked on an interactive prompt")
 
-    # 4. Attribution, including the execution anchor.
+    # 4. Attribution: the dispatch record must be well formed AND agree with the
+    #    identifiers the evidence itself carries. Flags on the dispatch record
+    #    alone are self-assertion, not correspondence.
+    observed = collect_observed_identity(scenario)
+    manifest_attempts = observed.pop("manifest_attempt_id", [])
+
     attributed = attribution.check(dispatch)
     if not attributed.ok:
         return Decision("hold", attributed.reason)
 
+    for field, values in observed.items():
+        for value in values:
+            if value != dispatch.get(field):
+                return Decision("hold", "attribution mismatch on {}: observed {!r}, "
+                                        "dispatched {!r}".format(field, value,
+                                                                 dispatch.get(field)))
+
+    # The finalized report must belong to the attempt being judged; a manifest
+    # from another attempt is evidence of a different run finishing.
+    for manifest_attempt in manifest_attempts:
+        if manifest_attempt != dispatch.get("attempt_id"):
+            return Decision("hold",
+                            "report manifest belongs to attempt {!r}, not {!r}".format(
+                                manifest_attempt, dispatch.get("attempt_id")))
+
     # 5. Still working, or a tool is running underneath a ready prompt.
     if latest.get("agent_status") not in QUIESCENT:
         return Decision("hold", "agent is not quiescent (status={!r})".format(

tests/test_issue5_phase2a_loop.py

@@ -695,3 +695,195 @@ def test_g9_phase2a_spawns_no_daemon_and_calls_no_frozen_helper():
         src = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
         for forbidden in ("ensure_subscriber_daemon", "preexec_fn", "lib.sh"):
             assert forbidden not in src, "{} references {}".format(path.name, forbidden)
+
+
+# ==============================================================================
+# 8. Cross-review regressions (job 9d1e0077)
+#
+# F-A (claude): the CAS table omitted two legitimate wrapper transitions, so
+#               `submit --type loop|discuss` silently stopped working by default
+#               and the CLI still exited 0.
+# F-B (claude): the audit status mirror moved outside the lock and became
+#               last-writer-wins, so a slow flush could leave it behind.
+# R1  (codex):  the policy trusted the dispatch record's own flags and never
+#               confronted the identifiers the evidence carried.
+# R2  (codex):  a supplied expected_attempt was ignored when the record had none.
+# R3  (codex):  a raw status field rode in on a metadata merge.
+# ==============================================================================
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("mode", CAS_MODES)
+def test_fa_wrapper_loop_redispatch_and_finalize_work(mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch, mode):
+    """F-A: the exact CLI calls the wrapper makes for --type loop|discuss.
+
+    Iteration reset hands a finished job to the next session; exhausting the
+    budget finalises it as an error. Both must work in either mode."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("MAM_ENGINE_CAS", mode)
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import mqtt_common, registry
+
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg, agent_session="herdr:claude", job_type="loop")
+    mqtt_common.update_job_status(job_id, reg, _source="publish_event", status="completed")
+
+    rc = registry.main(["--registry-dir", reg, "update", "--job", job_id,
+                        "--agent-session", "herdr:rev", "--prompt", "review",
+                        "--iteration", "2", "--role", "Reviewer", "--status", "pending"])
+    record = _load(reg, job_id)
+    assert rc == 0, "the wrapper's iteration reset must succeed"
+    assert record["status"] == "pending"
+    assert record["iteration"] == 2, "metadata must not be discarded"
+    assert record["agent_session"] == "herdr:rev"
+
+    mqtt_common.update_job_status(job_id, reg, _source="publish_event", status="completed")
+    rc2 = registry.main(["--registry-dir", reg, "status", "--job", job_id, "--set", "error"])
+    assert rc2 == 0
+    assert _load(reg, job_id)["status"] == "error"
+
+
+def test_fa_redispatch_requires_operator_authority_and_a_forward_attempt(
+    mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """The new authority must not become a way for an agent to undo a terminal."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "claim", registry_dir=reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "completed", registry_dir=reg)
+
+    agent = engine.transition(job_id, "redispatch", registry_dir=reg,
+                              fields={"iteration": 2}, source="publish_event")
+    assert agent.committed is False and "operator authority" in agent.reason
+
+    stale = engine.transition(job_id, "redispatch", registry_dir=reg,
+                              fields={"iteration": 1}, source="registry_cli")
+    assert stale.committed is False and "does not advance" in stale.reason
+
+    ok = engine.transition(job_id, "redispatch", registry_dir=reg,
+                           fields={"iteration": 2}, source="registry_cli")
+    assert ok.committed and ok.to_status == "pending"
+
+
+def test_fa_agent_still_cannot_move_a_terminal(mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """The protection the CAS table exists for must survive the new authority."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import mqtt_common
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    mqtt_common.update_job_status(job_id, reg, _source="publish_event", status="completed")
+    mqtt_common.update_job_status(job_id, reg, _source="publish_event", status="error")
+    assert _load(reg, job_id)["status"] == "completed"
+
+
+def test_fa_a_refused_operator_write_exits_non_zero(mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """The silence is what hid F-A: a refused write used to exit 0."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine, registry
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "claim", registry_dir=reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "completed", registry_dir=reg)
+    # cancelled after completed is a genuine conflict, and must be reported
+    rc = registry.main(["--registry-dir", reg, "status", "--job", job_id, "--set", "cancelled"])
+    assert rc != 0, "a refused operator write must not look like success"
+    assert _load(reg, job_id)["status"] == "completed"
+
+
+def test_fb_a_late_status_mirror_cannot_overwrite_a_newer_one(mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """F-B: the mirror runs outside the lock, so ordering rides on transition_seq."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import mqtt_common
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    logs = mqtt_common.get_logs_dir()
+
+    mqtt_common.update_logged_status(job_id, "completed", logs, transition_seq=2)
+    mqtt_common.update_logged_status(job_id, "running", logs, transition_seq=1)  # late flush
+    assert mqtt_common.read_logged_status(job_id, logs)["status"] == "completed"
+    # a genuinely newer transition still lands
+    mqtt_common.update_logged_status(job_id, "error", logs, transition_seq=3)
+    assert mqtt_common.read_logged_status(job_id, logs)["status"] == "error"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field,value", [
+    ("agent_session_uuid", "someone-else"),
+    ("attempt_id", 999),
+    ("job_id", "another-job"),
+])
+def test_r1_policy_rejects_evidence_that_contradicts_the_dispatch(field, value):
+    """R1: attribution must confront what was observed, not just the record."""
+    from lib_py.loop import policy
+    import copy
+    scenario = json.loads((WATCHER_FIXTURES / "finalized_candidate.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    assert policy.decide(scenario).decision == "candidate_approved"
+    mutated = copy.deepcopy(scenario)
+    mutated["timeline"][2]["payload"][field] = value
+    decision = policy.decide(mutated)
+    assert decision.decision == "hold", "{}={!r} must not be approved".format(field, value)
+    assert field in decision.reason
+
+
+def test_r1_policy_rejects_a_manifest_from_another_attempt():
+    """A finalized report proves *an* attempt finished, not necessarily this one."""
+    from lib_py.loop import policy
+    import copy
+    scenario = json.loads((WATCHER_FIXTURES / "finalized_candidate.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    mutated = copy.deepcopy(scenario)
+    mutated["timeline"][1]["payload"]["report_manifest"]["attempt_id"] = 999
+    decision = policy.decide(mutated)
+    assert decision.decision == "hold" and "manifest" in decision.reason
+
+
+def test_r2_expected_attempt_must_be_proved_not_merely_uncontradicted(
+    mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch
+):
+    """R2: a precondition the record cannot answer must fail closed."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine, mqtt_common
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "claim", registry_dir=reg)
+
+    record = _load(reg, job_id)
+    record.pop("iteration", None)
+    record.pop("attempt_id", None)
+    mqtt_common._atomic_write_record(job_id, reg, record)
+    before = _dir_fingerprint(Path(reg))
+
+    res = engine.transition(job_id, "completed", registry_dir=reg, expected_attempt=999)
+    assert res.committed is False and "carries none" in res.reason
+    assert _dir_fingerprint(Path(reg)) == before, "a rejection must not write"
+
+    # with an attempt present the precondition behaves normally
+    engine.transition(job_id, "progress", registry_dir=reg, fields={"attempt_id": 7})
+    assert engine.transition(job_id, "completed", registry_dir=reg,
+                             expected_attempt=8).committed is False
+    assert engine.transition(job_id, "completed", registry_dir=reg,
+                             expected_attempt=7).committed is True
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("request_", ["progress", "permission_required", "merge"])
+def test_r3_a_status_cannot_ride_in_as_a_metadata_field(
+    mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch, request_
+):
+    """R3: the boundary itself must refuse it, not just one wrapper."""
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "claim", registry_dir=reg)
+    res = engine.transition(job_id, request_, registry_dir=reg,
+                            fields={"status": "completed"})
+    assert res.committed is False and "must be requested" in res.reason
+    assert _load(reg, job_id)["status"] == "running"
+
+
+def test_r3_an_unknown_request_is_refused(mam_sandbox, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.chdir(mam_sandbox)
+    from lib_py.delegation import engine
+    reg = _reg(tmp_path)
+    job_id = _make_job(reg)
+    engine.transition(job_id, "claim", registry_dir=reg)
+    res = engine.transition(job_id, "not_a_request", registry_dir=reg, fields={"x": 1})
+    assert res.committed is False and "unknown request" in res.reason
+    assert "x" not in _load(reg, job_id)