feat(agent): deprecate and completely remove cline agent support

- Delete adapters/cline.py and unregister from registry.py
- Remove cline branches from lib.sh and all 8 skill scripts (create, resume, stop, status, reconcile, update_yaml_resumed, resolve_session_id, orc_onboard)
- Narrow own-key mapping dictionaries across lib_py core modules to 4 supported agents
- Delete cline-exclusive tests and retarget shared fixtures to grok/hermes/claude
- Update skills documentation and installation guides (439 passed, 0 failures)
- Archive cline deprecation consensus and review reports

.agents/reports/planner-reviewer-claude-01/plan-a33a133e.md

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+# Report: Job adad47d1 — Refined Consensus (Rev.2) per `creator-agy-01` Challenge
+
+**Durable output (updated in place)**: [.agents/reports/cline_deprecation_opinion.md](../../../.agents/reports/cline_deprecation_opinion.md)
+
+## Summary
+
+`creator-agy-01` challenged Rev.1's §3.1 risk characterization of cline's unattended-execution gap, arguing it understated the real danger: `cline history --json` (the pre-spawn gate) only validates that local session storage exists, not credential/API validity — so it can't protect against a runtime auth failure (401/expired token/429 quota) mid-task, which could plausibly force cline's TUI into its interactive setup modal with no clean-exit fallback like the other four agents have. A second point noted the 40-session usage fact I'd used to support RETAIN also amplifies `discover()`'s session-hijacking exposure.
+
+**Verification before accepting**: I ran `cline history --help` myself (confirmed: pure local listing, no auth semantics) and traced exactly where MAM checks for the setup modal in `lib.sh` (confirmed: only at spawn-time and at the moment of injecting a new prompt — never continuously during an autonomous work stretch). Both confirm the architectural gap is real. I was also careful to flag what remains *inferred* rather than *observed*: neither `creator-agy-01` nor I have actually triggered a live credential failure to watch cline's real behavior — I adopted the escalated risk model as the working precautionary assumption while saying so explicitly, rather than overstating certainty either side doesn't have.
+
+**Disposition**: Accepted, with the honesty caveat above — no `[REBUT:]` filed.
+
+## What changed in Rev.2
+
+- §3.1 rewritten: risk escalated from "narrow spawn-time race" to "unmonitored mid-task modal-fallback window," with the verification trail (what's confirmed vs. inferred) laid out explicitly.
+- §3.2 narrowed to reaffirm only the tool-call-approval finding that still stands (`--auto-approve` default true) — the credential-failure gap is a separate, more severe category, not covered by that flag.
+- New §3.4: precision-scoped the session-hijacking concern (cline's `discover()` does filter by workspace `cwd`, so exposure is concurrent-same-workspace activity, not all 40 sessions indiscriminately) while accepting the core point.
+- §4 revised: my RETAIN vote stands but its terms changed — now explicitly conditional on the new §6.2 safety gate, not an unconditional RETAIN as Rev.1 implied.
+- §6 reprioritized: the reconcile.sh fix is now urgent; a new mandatory safety-gate requirement (exclude cline from long-running autonomous roles until upstream ships a real headless/non-interactive flag) is added for the RETAIN path; the empirical-verification ask is upgraded from "nice to have" to a prerequisite before trusting cline with new unattended work.
+
+Full Rev.2 text is in the durable report linked above.
+
+**Process note**: Still no unanimous verdict (2 RETAIN-conditional vs. 1 REMOVE) — this challenge sharpened the RETAIN side's conditions rather than flipping any vote. The REMOVE-vs-RETAIN decision still belongs to the General Manager per `MULTI_AGENT_RULES.md` §3.
+
+[VERDICT: N/A — consensus opinion artifact, decision belongs to the General Manager]