Files
multi-agent-mux/.agents/skills/lib_py/delegation/engine.py
T
GodopuandClaude Opus 5 803ba43884 feat(issue-5): auto-completion gate and durable pending notification
The gate does not re-decide anything. Phase 2a already decides, fail-closed and
against contract-pinned vectors; this supplies real evidence to that decision and
commits only if three independent gates agree: the global switch is on, the
backend has observed evidence that it reaches a quiescent state, and the job
itself opted in. Default is off.

The backend allowlist is evidence-based rather than optimistic. Inferring
"finished" from stillness requires stillness to have been observed, and only
three of six backends have that. An operator may narrow the list; a name that
was never observed is dropped rather than trusted, so it cannot be widened by
configuration.

Everything else holds. An unreadable manifest, a report rewritten after
finalization, missing evidence for a declared side effect, a policy that raises:
all refuse. "Could not decide" is never "done". A late explicit terminal wins,
because the boundary refuses the inferred one -- that is the boundary working,
not an error in the gate.

Notification intent is committed in the same atomic write as the state, so a
crash between committing and publishing leaves a record that still says the
world has not been told. Recovery re-sends; duplicates are already dropped by
sequence. A failed send deliberately leaves the intent pending, because an
unsent notification that looks sent is worse than one that is retried.

Two fixes this surfaced. Settling used a request that terminal records refuse,
which made an owed notification impossible to ever settle; settling is now a
status-free bookkeeping request, valid in any state. And the phase 2a guard
against shell references was matching hashlib.sha256 as a substring, so it now
requires a word boundary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UrDNJkHmm18uu7n7JwV5Qd
2026-09-06 21:30:38 +09:00

317 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""The single state-transition authority.
Every job-status write goes through `transition`. Before phase 2a there were two
write paths: `update_job_status` merged fields unconditionally, and
`pick_pending` hand-rolled a correct pending->running swap plus its own audit
mirror. Neither was wrong on its own; having two was the risk, because a fix or
a rule added to one silently misses the other.
It lives in `lib_py.delegation`, not `lib_py.loop`, because it writes the
registry and the registry writers are here. A frozen loop can bind
`lib_py.delegation` to a different tree than the parent package, so delegation
importing a sibling would mix trees -- the rule this package states in its own
__init__, and which caught this during implementation.
Lock discipline (the reason this is a module and not a helper):
with registry_lock: decide, write the record once, QUEUE notifications
after the lock: flush notifications, publish, anything slow
Nothing that can block on another process or the network may run while the lock
is held. `pick_pending` already mirrored its audit entries after releasing the
lock; this generalises that shape to every transition.
`MAM_ENGINE_CAS=0` restores the previous unconditional-merge behaviour without a
redeploy. The legacy bodies are preserved by their callers for that reason.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from lib_py.delegation import mqtt_common
logger = logging.getLogger("loop.engine")
TERMINAL_STATUSES = ("completed", "error", "cancelled")
NON_TERMINAL_STATUSES = ("pending", "running")
# request -> the status it asks for. `merge`/`progress` ask for nothing.
REQUEST_TO_STATUS = {
"claim": "running",
"started": "running",
"progress": None,
"permission_required": None,
"completed": "completed",
"error": "error",
"cancelled": "cancelled",
"deadline_timeout": "error",
"merge": None,
# Operator-authority requests. The wrapper drives multi-iteration delegation
# (`submit --type loop|discuss`) by re-dispatching a finished job to the next
# session, and by finalising it as an error when the iteration budget is
# exhausted. Both legitimately move a terminal record, which is why they are
# separate requests gated on authority rather than an exception in the table.
"redispatch": "pending",
"finalize": "error",
# Bookkeeping: records that an owed notification was delivered. It cannot
# change status, and it is *about* a terminal, so refusing it in a terminal
# state would make an owed notification impossible to ever settle.
"notification_settled": None,
}
# Requests that carry no status at all and are therefore safe in any state,
# including a terminal one. Keep this list short and obviously status-free.
BOOKKEEPING_REQUESTS = ("notification_settled",)
# Only these sources may move a record out of a terminal state. An agent can
# never walk back its own terminal; that is the whole point of the CAS table.
OPERATOR_SOURCES = ("registry_cli", "operator")
OPERATOR_REQUESTS = ("redispatch", "finalize")
# A caller that merges `status=<value>` is making the request that owns that
# value; mapping it here is what stops a raw field write from sidestepping the
# CAS table. Every status has an owning request, `pending` included: the wrapper
# resets a finished job to pending to hand it to the next iteration.
STATUS_TO_REQUEST = {
"pending": "redispatch",
"running": "started",
"completed": "completed",
"error": "error",
"cancelled": "cancelled",
}
def cas_enabled() -> bool:
"""The rollback switch. Read per call so a test or operator can flip it."""
return os.environ.get("MAM_ENGINE_CAS", "1") != "0"
class TransitionResult(object):
__slots__ = ("committed", "from_status", "to_status", "reason", "record",
"notifications", "idempotent")
def __init__(self, committed, from_status, to_status, reason, record, notifications,
idempotent=False):
self.committed = committed
# Not every uncommitted transition is a refusal. Re-receiving a terminal
# that already holds is a no-op ACK in the contract table, and a caller
# that treats it as failure turns a success path into an error.
self.idempotent = idempotent
self.from_status = from_status
self.to_status = to_status
self.reason = reason
self.record = record
self.notifications = notifications
def __repr__(self): # pragma: no cover - debugging aid
return "TransitionResult(committed={!r}, {!r}->{!r}, {!r})".format(
self.committed, self.from_status, self.to_status, self.reason)
class _Decision(object):
__slots__ = ("commit", "to_status", "reason", "conflict", "idempotent")
def __init__(self, commit, to_status, reason, conflict=False, idempotent=False):
self.commit = commit
self.to_status = to_status
self.reason = reason
self.conflict = conflict
self.idempotent = idempotent
def _decide(record: Dict[str, Any], request: str, expected_status, expected_attempt,
source="unknown", fields=None) -> _Decision:
"""Pure CAS decision. No I/O, so it is safe to call under the lock.
Implements the target table in docs/contracts/issue-5/state-transitions.md §3.
"""
current = record.get("status")
fields = fields or {}
# An unrecognised request must never fall through to the permissive branch.
if request not in REQUEST_TO_STATUS:
return _Decision(False, current, "unknown request: {!r}".format(request))
# A status may only be set by the request that owns it. Letting one ride in
# as an ordinary field would let `progress` commit a terminal, which is the
# decision table being bypassed from inside its own boundary.
if "status" in fields:
return _Decision(False, current,
"status must be requested, not merged as a field "
"(got status={!r} on request {!r})".format(fields["status"], request))
# A supplied precondition must be *proved*, not merely un-contradicted. If a
# caller names an expected attempt and the record cannot show one, the
# compare-and-swap has nothing to compare and must fail closed.
if expected_attempt is not None:
actual = record.get("attempt_id", record.get("iteration"))
if actual is None:
return _Decision(False, current,
"expected attempt {!r} but the record carries none".format(
expected_attempt))
if actual != expected_attempt:
return _Decision(False, current,
"stale attempt: expected {!r}, record has {!r}".format(
expected_attempt, actual))
if expected_status is not None and current != expected_status:
return _Decision(False, current,
"precondition failed: expected status {!r}, found {!r}".format(
expected_status, current))
requested = REQUEST_TO_STATUS.get(request, None)
# Authority first, so a refusal says *why* rather than blaming the state.
if request in OPERATOR_REQUESTS and source not in OPERATOR_SOURCES:
return _Decision(False, current,
"{} requires operator authority (source={!r})".format(request, source))
if request in BOOKKEEPING_REQUESTS:
return _Decision(True, None, "bookkeeping ({})".format(request))
if current in TERMINAL_STATUSES:
# Idempotent re-receipt of the same terminal is a no-op ack.
if requested == current:
return _Decision(False, current, "idempotent: already {}".format(current),
idempotent=True)
operator = source in OPERATOR_SOURCES
if operator and request == "redispatch":
# Re-dispatching a finished job to the next iteration. The attempt
# must move forward, so a replayed redispatch cannot resurrect it.
new_iteration = fields.get("iteration")
old_iteration = record.get("iteration")
if new_iteration is None:
return _Decision(False, current,
"redispatch requires an iteration", conflict=True)
if old_iteration is not None and int(new_iteration) <= int(old_iteration):
return _Decision(False, current,
"redispatch iteration {!r} does not advance past {!r}".format(
new_iteration, old_iteration), conflict=True)
return _Decision(True, "pending", "{} -> pending (redispatch)".format(current))
if operator and request in ("finalize", "error"):
return _Decision(True, "error", "{} -> error (finalize)".format(current))
if requested is None:
return _Decision(False, current,
"late {} after terminal {}; refusing".format(request, current),
conflict=True)
return _Decision(False, current,
"conflicting {} after terminal {}; refusing".format(requested, current),
conflict=True)
if requested is None:
# progress / permission_required / metadata-only merge. No status is set
# here: a status-bearing field was already refused above.
return _Decision(True, None, "metadata updated ({})".format(request))
return _Decision(True, requested, "{} -> {}".format(current, requested))
def _notification(job_id, kind, **fields) -> Dict[str, Any]:
payload = {"job_id": job_id, "kind": kind}
payload.update(fields)
return payload
def transition(job_id, request="merge", *, registry_dir=None, expected_status=None,
expected_attempt=None, fields=None, source="unknown",
notify=None) -> TransitionResult:
"""Decide and commit one state transition. The only writer of job status.
Returns a result whose `notifications` have ALREADY been flushed; the field
is kept so callers and tests can see what the transition emitted.
"""
registry_dir = registry_dir or mqtt_common.DEFAULT_REGISTRY_DIR
fields = dict(fields or {})
# ---- short transaction: decide and write, never do I/O that can block ----
with mqtt_common.registry_lock(registry_dir):
record = mqtt_common.load_job(job_id, registry_dir)
from_status = record.get("status")
decision = _decide(record, request, expected_status, expected_attempt,
source=source, fields=fields)
notifications: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
if decision.commit:
record.update(fields)
if decision.to_status is not None:
record["status"] = decision.to_status
record["updated_at"] = mqtt_common._utcnow()
# A monotonic counter so a late flush can still be ordered correctly
# once the audit mirror happens outside the lock.
record["transition_seq"] = int(record.get("transition_seq", 0) or 0) + 1
if notify is not None:
# One atomic commit records both the new state and the fact that
# the world has not been told yet. If the process dies before the
# publish, the record still says a notification is owed.
from lib_py.delegation import notifier
record[notifier.FIELD] = notifier.intent_for(
notify, record["transition_seq"], record["updated_at"],
detail=str(fields.get("detail", "")))
mqtt_common._atomic_write_record(job_id, registry_dir, record)
to_status = record.get("status")
if to_status != from_status:
notifications.append(_notification(
job_id, "status_changed", **{
"from": from_status, "to": to_status,
"by": source, "timestamp": record["updated_at"],
"transition_seq": record["transition_seq"],
}))
else:
to_status = from_status
if decision.conflict:
notifications.append(_notification(
job_id, "conflict_refused",
attempted=request, current=from_status,
reason=decision.reason, by=source,
timestamp=mqtt_common._utcnow()))
# ---- lock released; everything below may block ----
_flush(notifications, registry_dir)
if not decision.commit and decision.conflict:
logger.warning("refused %s for job %s: %s", request, job_id, decision.reason)
return TransitionResult(decision.commit, from_status, to_status,
decision.reason, record, notifications,
idempotent=decision.idempotent)
def _flush(notifications, registry_dir) -> None:
"""Mirror queued notifications into the audit log, outside the lock.
Best effort by design: the registry record is already durable, and an audit
write must never be able to fail a transition that has committed.
"""
for note in notifications:
job_id = note["job_id"]
kind = note["kind"]
try:
if kind == "status_changed":
mqtt_common.update_logged_status(
job_id, note["to"], updated_at=note.get("timestamp"),
transition_seq=note.get("transition_seq"))
mqtt_common.append_event(job_id, {
"event": "status_changed",
"from": note.get("from"),
"to": note.get("to"),
"by": note.get("by"),
"timestamp": note.get("timestamp"),
"transition_seq": note.get("transition_seq"),
})
elif kind == "conflict_refused":
mqtt_common.append_event(job_id, {
"event": "conflict_refused",
"attempted": note.get("attempted"),
"current": note.get("current"),
"reason": note.get("reason"),
"by": note.get("by"),
"timestamp": note.get("timestamp"),
})
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - best effort
logger.warning("audit mirror failed for %s: %s", job_id, exc)